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IN SEARCH OF AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRETION IN CANADA
LYNDA COLLINS, & LORNE SOSSINt
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important and least scrutinized areas of environmental
policy is the exercise of administrative discretion. Those committed to
environmental action tend to focus on law reform, international treaties,
and political commitments-for example, election proposals for carbon
taxes and pipelines, or environmental protections in global protocols and
trade agreements. Many proponents of stronger environmental
protection have focused their attention on the goal of a constitutional
amendment recognizing an explicit right to a healthy environment,'
while others seek recognition of environmental protection within
existing Charter rights.2 As the rights conversation evolves,, advocates
t Professor with the Centre for Environmental Law and Global Sustainability at the
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, situated on the traditional territory of
the Algonquin Nation.
Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 See e.g. David Suzuki Foundation, "The Blue Dot", online: Blue Dot <bluedot.ca>;
Margot Venton, Kaitlyn Mitchell, & Pierre Sadik, "Right to a Healthy Environment"
online: Ecojustice <www.ecojustice.ca/case/right-to-a-healthy-environment>; David
R Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada' Constitution
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) [Boyd, TheRight to a Healthy Environment].
2 See e.g. Lynda M Collins, "An Ecologically Literate Reading of the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms" (2009) 26 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 7 [Collins,
"Ecologically Literate"]; Nathalie J Chalifour, "Environmental Discrimination and
the Charter's Equality Guarantee: The Case of Drinking Water for First Nations
Living on Reserves" (2013) 43 RGD 183 [Chalifour, "Environmental
Discrimination"].
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must continue to grapple with the day-to-day reality of how decisions
that affect environmental preservation are currently made.
The daily reality of decision making in the environmental sphere
most often turns on a group of public servants, working for federal,
provincial, municipal, or Indigenous governments (or agencies, boards,
and commissions) and exercising statutory discretion. Settings of
statutory discretion arise where the statute empowers officials to make a
judgment-whether to exercise a specific authority or not, and if so, in
what ways and at what times. The judgment calls these officials
make-which regulations will accompany environmental legislation,
who will be appointed to environmental boards and regulatory agencies,
which development proposals to approve, the nature and scope of
mitigation requirements to put in place on those developments that are
approved, whose voices will have input in the decision making, how
statutory criteria will be interpreted, and more-have cumulatively come
to define the state of environmental protection in Canada.
Because of the importance of discretion in so many critical areas for
environmental preservation, we argue this area merits deeper scrutiny.
We also see a compelling link between recognizing constitutional
principles in the field of ecological sustainability on the one hand, and
cohering the exercise of discretion around principles of environmental
preservation on the other. Constitutional principles that guide
administrative discretion may come from several sources. In this study,
we focus on the potential of underlying or unwritten constitutional
principles (UCP) to ensure environmental discretion is not exercised in
ways that are inconsistent with the values of ecological sustainability.
This analysis will proceed in three stages. First, we explore the
dynamics of discretion in environmental law in Canada. Second, we
advance the view that ecological sustainability should be recognized as
an underlying or unwritten constitutional principle, which could
function as an effective constraint on environmental discretion. Third,
3 See e.g. Lynda M Collins, "Safeguarding the Longue Dure: Environmental Rights in
the Canadian Constitution" (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 519 [Collins, "Safeguarding the
LongueDure"].
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we analyze the principle of ecological sustainability through the lens of
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.4 We conclude that ecological sustainability is an
underlying principle of the Canadian constitutional order and that its
recognition by courts and governments could be a meaningful step
towards securing our common future.
DISCRETION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Canadian environmental law is characterized by profound and pervasive
discretion at every level of decision making. 5 While some discretion is
clearly necessary and important to the day-to-day decision making of
environmental regulators, there is a deep tension between the salutary
text of many environmental statutes and the troubling results of
discretionary decisions on the ground.6 In this section, we explore the
4 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5 See David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and
Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) [Boyd, UnnaturalLaw]; Jocelyn Stacey, "The
Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion in Environmental Law"
(2015) 52:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 985 [Stacey, "Environmental Emergency"].
6 See Stacey, "Environmental Emergency", supra note 5. See also "Living
Planet Report: Canada" (7 September 2017), online: World Wildlife Fund
Canada <www.wwf.ca/newsroom/reports/lprc.cfm> ["Living Planet Report"];
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, "Good Choices, Bad Choices:
Environmental Rights and Environmental Protection in Ontario" (24 October
2017), online (pdf): Environmental Commissioner of Ontario <docs.assets.eco.on.ca/
reports/environmental-protection/2017/Good-Choices-Bad-Choices.pdf> ["Good
Choices, Bad Choices"]; David R Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier: A4 Prescription
for Stronger Canadian Environmental Laws and Policies (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2015) [Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier]; Jan Burck, Franziska Marten &
Christoph Bals, "The Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2014"
(November 2013), online (pdf): Germanwatch <germanwatch.org/sites/
germanwatch.org/files/publication/8599.pdf>; "Country Profile of Environmental
Burden of Disease: Canada" (22 June 2009), online (pdf): World
Health Organization <www.who.int/quantifying ehimpacts/national/country
profile/canada.pdf?ua= 1 >.
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sources and exercise of discretion in environmental contexts, and the
relationship between the exercise of discretion and the rule of law.
A. THE SOURCES AND EXERCISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISc RETION
Discretion may arise in many ways that are relevant to environmental
decision making, 7 but in this study, we focus on two contexts. First, the
executive branch is empowered under statutes to make regulations for
the implementation or enforcement of statutory standards. While
statutes are the subject of parliamentary debate and public scrutiny,
regulations tend to be issued with far less attention and oversight.
Second, executive officials under both statutes and regulations are
empowered to exercise discretion over particular decisions (to approve or
reject proposals, to issue or refuse to issue permits, etc.). Each of these
settings of discretion has the potential to undermine the environmental
protections that Parliament or provincial and territorial legislatures have
put in place.
Parliament and the provincial legislatures have enacted broad
framework statutes that appear highly protective but are chronically
"undermined by their broadly discretionary nature"' As David R. Boyd
has explained, "[e]nvironmental laws are almost always drafted in such a
way as to give Canadian governments the power to take action or meet
specified standards but no duty to take action or meet those standards.",
The hallmark of discretion as a legal concept is that decision makers
may exercise choice and apply judgment where it is present. Those
choices and judgments are always demarcated by legal authority and are
guided in broader ways by the purposes and goals (whether explicit or
implicit) that the statutory authority is intended to advance, Moreover,
as Jocelyn Stacey notes:
7 See generally Anna Pratt & Lorne Sossin, "A Brief Introduction of the Puzzle of
Discretion" (2009) 24:3 CJLS 301.
8 Boyd, UnnaturalLaw, supra note5 at 231.
9 Ibid [emphasis in original].
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Many of the details and difficult trade-offs required by environmental
statutes are left to regulations. This means that the executive has
discretion both over whether to issue regulations and what those
regulations should say .... [R]egulations issued by the executive exist in
a legal black hole: The failure to issue regulations is not justiciable,
regulations are subject only to vires review, and they are not subject to
the requirements of procedural fairness.0
Tensions emerge when the exercise of discretion appears out of
alignment with the goals of the statutory authority. The discretion
exercised through environmental regulations, for example, often appears
inconsistent with the overarching goals of their enabling legislation.
Consider the core charging provision of Ontario's Environmental
Protection Act,i x which states that "a person shall not discharge a
contaminant or cause or permit the discharge of a contaminant into the
natural environment, if the discharge causes or may cause an adverse
effect " 12 with "adverse effect" defined broadly to include, inter alia,
"impairment of the quality of the natural environment for any use that
can be made of it, injury or damage to property or to plant or animal life,
harm or material discomfort to any person, [and] an adverse effect on
the health of any person."13 This provision would appear to provide
meaningful protection for human health and ecological integrity in
Ontario. However, under the regulation-making powers in the EP, 14
the Lieutenant Governor in Council has authorized the discharge of a
plethora of substances at levels that are known to cause serious harm to
human health and the environment.5 Indeed, the ministry even has the
10 Stacey, "Environmental Emergency", supra note 5 at 1006.
RSO 1990, c E 19 [EPA].
12 Ibid, s 14(1).
13 Ibid, s 1(1).
14 Ihid, ss 175.1-177.
1 See e.g. "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 ("Ontario's air standards for
some pollutants do not sufficiently protect human health" at 127); Boyd, Cleaner,
Greener, Healthier, supra note 6.
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discretion to make regulations that set no emissions limit at all and make
no attempt to reach health-based standards. 16
In one of Canada's most polluted airsheds, the Indigenous
community of Aamjiwnaang (near Sarnia), 17 for example, the Province of
Ontario has negotiated a special technical standard with industry for the
carcinogenic pollutant benzene. Instead of being required to meet the
regular health-based standard that applies elsewhere in Ontario, the six
petrochemical and petroleum facilities located closest to the
Aamjiwnaang community are allowed "to install the best available
technology that is 'economically achievable' rather than meet the
health-based standard, regardless of the impact on Aamjiwnaang." 1 The
new technical standard for benzene contains no hard limit on emissions
16 "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 129.
17 See "Sarnia Takes Title for Worst Air in Canada" (20 November 2012), online
(blog): Ecojustice <www.ecojustice.ca/blog/sarnia-takes-tide-for-worst -air-in-
canada>; "Public Health, Environmental and Social Determinants of Health
(PHE)" (last visited on 14 November 2018), online: World Health Organization
<www.who.int/phe/health topics/outdoorair/databases/en/index.html> (to access
the World Health Organization's raw data). See also Dayna Nadine Scott, "Situating
Sarnia: 'Unimagined Communities' in the New National Energy Debate" (2013) 25
J Envtl L & Prac 81 [Scott, "Situating Sarnia"]; Dayna Nadine Scott, "Confronting
Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution" (2008) 46:2
Osgoode Hall LJ 293; Kaitlyn Mitchell & Zachary D'Onofrio, "Environmental
Injustice and Racism in Canada: The First Step Is Admitting We Have a Problem"
(2016) 29 J Envd L & Prac 305; Emma McIntosh, "Ontario Government Ignored
Health Warnings from Its Own Engineers about Sarnia's Chemical Valley, Report
Claims", The Star (17 October 2017), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/
2017/10/17/ontario-government-ignored-health-warnings-from-its-own-engineers-
about -sarnias-chemical-valley-report -claims.html>.
18 "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 129. See also Bruce Pardy, "In Search
of the Holy Grail of Environmental Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem" (2005) 1:1
JSDLP 29 [Pardy, "Holy Grail"] (the uneven application of environmental laws
arguably raises its own rule of law concerns. Pardy asks the reader to "consider a law
that prohibited only selected categories of people from drinking and driving. If that
law exempted some people, and thus allowed them to drive drunk-those who
resided in particular neighbourhoods, perhaps-one would have no difficulty in
concluding that the law was awry" at 51).
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of this highly toxic chemical.19 As explained below, such regulatory
decisions are difficult to challenge under public law and the EPA has also
attempted to exclude liability under private law."
In addition to the important discretion to make regulations,
environmental regulators enjoy a whole suite of discretionary powers to
issue and amend site-specific approvals and administrative orders (such
as stop orders or control orders), and to decide whether to investigate
and/or prosecute environmental violations. Taking up the Aamjiwnaang
example once again, the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario has
identified a number of reasons for this community's remarkably high
levels of pollution, including the ministry's failure to include certain
kinds of emissions (notably gas flaring) in its regulatory calculations and
its inadequate treatment of cumulative impacts from the multiple sources
of pollution in Aamjiwnaang. 1 The Commissioner explains that
"Ontario regulates each facility's air emissions as if it were the only
emitter"." In communities with one or two significant polluters, this
legal fiction may have little practical significance. In a pollution hotspot
19 See "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6. See also Environmental Registry
Policy Decision #012-6857 Re: Petroleum Refining-Industry Standard under the
Local Air Quality Regulation, 0 Reg 419/05; Environmental Registry Policy
Decision #012-6859 Re: Petrochemical-Industry Standard under the Local Air
Quality Regulation, 0 Reg 419/05.
20 See EPA, supra note 11 ("[n]o action or other proceeding shall be brought against
the Crown, the Minister or an employee or agent of the Crown because of anything
arising out of or in relation to a matter carried on or purported to be carried on
pursuant to a regulation that exempts a person from the requirement to obtain a
licence, environmental compliance approval, renewable energy approval or permit"
at s 177.1).
21 "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 127-38.
22 Ibid at 130. See also Pardy, "Holy Grail", supra note 18 ("[o]ne of the main defects in
modern environmental law is its disregard for total load, or the cumulative
environmental impact created by all human activity-past, present, and future.
Instead, to the extent that human actions are regulated, they are regulated as isolated
events" at 38).
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such as Aamjiwnaang, it is literally a life-threatening defect in
environmental policy.23
The phenomenon of framework legislation whose goals of
environmental protection can be undermined by the broad discretion
accorded to public officials is mirrored at the federal level. For example,
section 35(1) of the Fisheries Act prohibits "any work, undertaking or
activity that results in serious harm to fish that are part of a commercial,
recreational or Aboriginal fishery, or to fish that support such a
fishery",24 but section 35(2) permits the Minister to "authorize such
harm pursuant to whatever terms and conditions he or she deems fit."25
Even in the national parks, where one might reasonably expect
environmental protections to be strongest, section 67 of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA) grants parks officials the
discretion to exempt certain projects from environmental assessment
where they determine that a project is not likely to cause an adverse
effect.26 Freedom of information requests by the Canadian Parks and
23 In 2009, members of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation filed an application under
Ontario's EnvironmentalBill of Rights (EBR), requesting the government reassess the
approach to air pollution regulation in communities with multiple sources of
pollution. The EBR requires the Minister to respond to such Applications within a
reasonable time. Eight years after filing the request, the Applicants still have yet to
receive a response and they have now filed an application for judicial review alleging
that this long delay is unreasonable. See e.g. Allison Jones, "Ontario First Nation
Resident Seeks Long-Promised Air Pollution Review", The Globe and Mail (30 July
2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario-first-nation-
resident-seeks-long-promised-air-pollution-review/article358 4 04 83>.
24 RSC 1988, c F-14, s 35(1).
25 See Martin Olszynski, "Environmental Laws as Decision-Making Processes (or,
Why I Am Grateful for Environmental Groups this Earth Day)" (22 April 2015),
online (blog): ABlawg: The University of Calgary Faculty of Law Blog <www.ablawg
.ca/2015/04/22/environmental-laws-as-decision-making-processes-or-why-i-am-
grateful-for-environmental-groups-this-earth-day>. See also Bruce Pardy,
"Abstraction, Precedent, and Articulate Consistency: Making Environmental
Decisions" (1998) 34:2 Cal WL Rev 427; Bruce Pardy, "Planning for Serfdom:
Resource Management and the Rule of Law" (1997) NZLJ 69.
26 SC 2012, c 19, s 52, s 67.
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Wilderness Society have revealed that, between 2013 and 2016, "Parks
Canada determined that none of 1533 projects approved in that time
were likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects". 7 The
provision that allows Parks Canada to exempt projects from
environmental assessment was added to the CEAA as part of a suite of
amendments made by the Canadian government under Prime Minister
Harper in 2012, which "dramatically weakened [the Act], imposing short
time periods for the completion of assessments, transferring
decision-making powers to provincial and territorial governments,
limiting public participation, and reducing the number of federal
assessments from thousands each year to less than two dozen."21
In the same period, other steps were taken that significantly eroded
environmental protections, including amendments to the Fisheries Act
that eviscerated key habitat protection provisions, the repeal of the Kyoto
Protocol Implementation Act, and the weakening of the Species at Risk
Act.2 9 The inconsistent efficacy of Canadian environmental legislation
derives not only from administrative discretion (and habitual judicial
deference, as discussed below), but also from the ever-present threat of
such legislative rollbacks. In the absence of any constitutional limits,
governments are free to sacrifice long-term environmental health to
short-term political goals. The backward momentum in environmental
law under the Harper government arguably could not have occurred
with respect to employment equity or same-sex spousal rights, for
example, because of the constitutional backstop.
27 Alison Woodley & Anne-Marie Syslak, "Restoring Legal Rigour to Environmental
Assessments in National Parks: CPAWS Submission to the Expert Review Panel on
Environmental Assessment" (23 December 2016) at 3, online (pdf): Expert Panek
Review of Environmental Assessment Processes <eareview-examenee.ca/wp-content/
uploads/uploaded files/cpaws-submission-to-review-panel-dec-23.pdf>.
28 Lynda M Collins & David R Boyd, "Non-Regression and the Charter Right to a
Healthy Environment" (2016) 29J Envd L & Prac 285 at 288. See alsoJobs, Growth,
andLong-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19.
29 See Collins & Boyd, supra note 28 at 287-89.
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To summarize, Canadian environmental law suffers from the
pervasive effect of discretionary powers that allow the executive branch
to pass regulations setting standards that fail to protect human or
ecosystem health, and exempt industry from protective requirements
that would otherwise apply, among other rules and decision making that
appear at odds with the purpose of the statutes under which the
regulations have been made. Additionally, the exercise of discretionary
powers in Canada has proven susceptible to similar influences, such as
decisions not to prosecute offenders when existing standards
were violated.31
Decades worth of data demonstrate that regulatory discretion in
environmental law is habitually exercised in favour of commercial rather
than environmental interests, 31 and the results of this phenomenon are
serious. The World Health Organization has estimated that
environmental burdens cause or contribute to 36,800 premature deaths
in Canada each year.32 Canada's under-protective environmental regime
also undermines the sustainability of agriculture, fisheries, and
forestry-the lifeblood of millions of Canadians. Iconic Canadian
species such as the polar bear, woodland caribou, and right whale are
threatened or endangered.33 Globally, Canada's environmental record is
weak in comparison with other industrialized nations.3 4 We have failed
to do our part to prevent or mitigate climate change and, indeed, we
continue to move forward with the exploitation of Alberta's oil sands,
which contribute to both global climate change and local environmental
31 See Jason MacLean, "Striking at the Root Problem in Canadian Environmental Law:
Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture" (2016) 29:1 J Envtl L & Prac 111;
Lynda Collins, "Tort, Democracy and Environmental Governance: Crown Liability
for Environmental Non-Enforcement" (2007) 15:2 Tort L Rev 107.
31 See e.g. Boyd, UnnaturalLaw, supra note 5; MacLean, ibid.
32 "Country Profile of Environmental Burden of Disease: Canada", supra note 6.
33 See "Living Planet Report", supra note 6.
34 See Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier, supra note 6 at 6-11; Laurel Sefton
MacDowell, An EnvironmentalHistory of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
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illness. 35 In addition to causing harm to human health and the
environment, discretion in Canadian environmental law highlights the
tension between the rule of public officials and the rule of law.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW
There are a number of administrative law and constitutional principles
that act as limits to the exercise of environmental discretion. For
example, within the bounds of statutory authority, administrative law
recognizes both procedural and substantive limits to the exercise of
discretion at common law. As discussed below, however, this existing
legal accountability under administrative law does little to actually guide
the content of discretionary decision making, and too often amounts to
an ineffective and cosmetic check on the problems with discretion.
Procedurally, administrative law requires that those affected by
discretionary decisions have an opportunity to be heard before the
discretion is exercised, and includes subsidiary rights to notice,
disclosure, reasons, and so forth. Additionally, those affected by such
decisions are entitled to a decision-making process that is sufficiently
impartial and independent, which includes both individual features (to
ensure a particular official exercising discretion is not biased in the mind
of a reasonable observer) and institutional features (to ensure that
decision makers generally are not subject to improper influences).
Importantly, these procedural protections are limited to individual
decision making and do not extend to the making of regulations.36
Moreover, because these are common law protections, they can be
overridden by statute. In Imperial Oil,37 for example, the Supreme Court
35 See MacDowell, supra note 34.
36 See Inuit Tapirisat etal v Canada (Attorney General), [1980] 2 SCR 735, 115 DLR
(3d) 1. See also Genevieve Cartier, "Administrative Discretion: Between Exercising
Power and Conducting Dialogue" in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds,
Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications,
2013), 381 at 383-84.
37 Imperial Oil Ltd v Quebec (Minister of the Environment), 2003 SCC 58 at paras 25-
28 [Imperial Oil].
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affirmed the legislature's ability to significantly curtail procedural
protections in the context of polluter pay legislation, provided the
statute in question did not contravene constitutional standards. This
case reaffirmed the common law nature of administrative law
accountability-it can fill in gaps where the statute does not set out a
specific process, but these procedural guarantees can also be modified or
eliminated altogether where a statute expressly provides. This principle
represents parliamentary supremacy on the one hand, but a key
limitation of administrative law protections on the other hand.
Another limitation is that enforcing administrative law procedural
protections requires that some person, group, or entity challenge a
decision in court. Beyond the significant access to justice barriers, such as
cost and complexity involved in judicial review, it is not always easy to
determine the scope of affected parties when it comes to environmental
decisions-is it the particular owner of an affected property, or people
who live in the vicinity and whose air and water quality may be adversely
affected, or a broader group that uses or needs access to an area for
their well-being ?
With respect to substantive challenges to the exercise of
administrative discretion in environmental contexts, administrative law
recognizes a range of constraints that can be the subject of judicial review
challenges (subject to the same challenges with respect to standing noted
above). Significantly, in the context of specialized areas of public
decision making, such as environmental law, decision makers will be
accorded deference by the courts when reviewing their decisions on
substantive grounds.,, Generally, the question for the courts is whether a
3 See Jamie Benidickson & Heather C McLeod-Kilmurray, "The Role of the Judiciary
in Environmental Governance: Canada" in Louis Kotze & Alexander R Paterson,
eds, The Role of the Judiciary in Environmental Governance: Comparative Perspectives
(Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 209-48.
'9 See generally Andrew Green, "An Enormous Systemic Problem: Delegation,
Responsibility and Federal Environmental Law" (2016) 28:2 J Envtl L & Prac 155
[Green, "An Enormous Systemic Problem"]; Jason MacLean & Chris Tollefson,
"Climate-Proofing Judicial Review After Paris: Judicial Competence, Capacity, and
Courage" (2018) 31:3 J Envtl L & Prac 245 at 247-52; Andrew Green, "Discretion,
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minister or delegate's discretionary decision was "reasonable."4° The
grounds for alleging a discretionary decision was unreasonable include
that it was exercised in bad faith or for improper or discriminatory
purposes, failed to consider relevant factors or considered irrelevant
factors, did not meet a standard of "justification, transparency[,] and
intelligibility", or interpreted a statutory or regulatory provision in a way
that cannot be reasonably sustained.
4 1
Because of the limitations of administrative law in overseeing
administrative discretion, it is important to explore accountability for
discretionary decision making under the Constitution. It is to this
question that our analysis now turns.
One aspect of such accountability under the Constitution flows from
Canadian federalism. 42 In R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd,'4 for
example, the Supreme Court affirmed that environmental protection (in
that case, the control of marine pollution) could constitute a matter of
national concern enabling the federal government to legislate in areas
that otherwise do not fall under federal jurisdiction. The Court
held that:
[T]o qualify as a matter of national concern, it must have a singleness,
distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from
matters of provincial concern, and a scale of impact on provincial
jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of
Judicial Review and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act" (2002) 27:2
Queen's LJ 785.
4' Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9.
41 Ibid at paras 44-51.
42 See Errol Meidinger, Daniel Spitzer & Charles Malcomb, "Environmental Principles
in US and Canadian Law" in Ludwig Krimer & Emanuela Orlando, eds, Principles of
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 405. See also Herman Bakvis,
Gerald Baier & Douglas Brown, "The Environmental Union" in Contested
Federalism: Certainty and Ambiguity in the Canadian Federation (Oxford University
Press, 2009), 205; Alexis Belanger, "Canadian Federalism in the Context of
Combating Climate Change" (2011) 20:1 Const Forum Const 21.
[1988] 1 SCR401,49 DLR (4th) 161 [Crown Zellerbach].
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legislative power under the Constitution .... [I]t must have
ascertainable and reasonable limits, in so far as its impact on provincial
jurisdiction is concerned.44
Because marine pollution affects Canada as a whole, it qualified as a
matter of national concern falling within the federal peace, order, and
good government power. A similar conclusion will almost certainly be
reached in the ongoing lawsuits by several provinces challenging the
federal government's constitutional capacity to set a baseline price on
carbon emissions.45
The Supreme Court also has recognized broad federal jurisdiction
over environmental protection based on its criminal law power under the
Constitution Act, 1867. In Hydro-Qudbec,46 the Court upheld contested
provisions of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) as a
valid exercise of criminal law. Since the Hydro-Qudbec decision, the
Supreme Court has moderated the scope of this jurisdiction to some
extent, recognizing that too broad a definition of criminal law presents
risks. The Court in Hydro-Qudbec also expressed some reticence in
relying on the national dimensions doctrine from Crown Zellerbach,
given its even greater impact on the balance of powers within
Canadian federalism.
While Canadian federalism represents an important context and
backdrop for constitutional principles in relation to environmental
protection, it does not advance a view that discretion under either the
federal or provincial/territorial legislation should be exercised in ways
that enhance environmental protection or ecological sustainability.
4 Ibid at paras 33- 39.
45 See Janyce McGregor, "Ontario Joins Saskatchewan in Opposing Federal Carbon
Tax Plan" CBC News (19 July 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carbon-
tax-premiers-thursday-1.4752747>. See also Alastair R Lucas & Jenette Yearsley,
"The Constitutionality of Federal Climate Change Legislation" (2012) 23:1 J Envtl
L & Prac 171; Nathalie J Chalifour, "Canadian Climate Federalism: Parliament's
Ample Constitutional Authority to Regulate GHG Emissions through Regulations,
Cap and Trade or a National Carbon Tax" (2016) 36 NJCL 331.
46 R vHydro-Qubec, [1997] 3 SCR213, 151 DLR (4th) 32 [Hydro-Qubec].
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A more substantive constitutional constraint on environmental
discretion may flow from the Charter. Until (and unless) the Charter is
amended to include an explicit environmental right,47 such rights will
need to be located within existing provisions of the Charter. More
accurately, Canadian courts need to recognize that existing guarantees,
such as the rights to equality, freedom of religion, life, liberty, and
security of the person, can be violated by serious "state-sponsored
environmental harm".4 A robust body of scholarship supports the view
that existing Charter rights can be (and have been) violated by
government decisions in the realm of environment. 49 State-sponsored
The benefits of such an explicit provision are many and well-supported by relevant
empirical data. See Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, supra note 1; James R
May & Erin Daly, Environmental Constitutionalism (London: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2016); Collins & Boyd, supra note 28.
41 Collins & Boyd, supra note 28 at 291.
49 See e.g. Nathalie J Chalifour & Jessica Earle, "Feeling the Heat: Climate Litigation
Under the Canadian Charter's Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person"
(2018) 42 Vermont L Rev 689; Kaitlyn Mitchell & Zachary D'Onofrio,
"Environmental Injustice and Racism in Canada: The First Step Is Admitting We
Have a Problem" (2016) 29J Envtl L & Prac 305; Collins, "Safeguarding the Longue
Durde", supra note 3; Avnish Nanda, "Heavy Oil Processing in Peace River, Alberta:
A Case Study on the Scope of Section 7 of the Charter in the Environmental Realm"
(2015) 27:2 J Envtl L & Prac 109; David W L Wu, "Embedding Environmental
Rights in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter: Resolving the Tension Between the
Need for Precaution and the Need for Harm" (2014) 33:2 NJCL 191; Chalifour,
"Environmental Discrimination", supra note 2; Lynda M Collins, "Security of the
Person, Peace of Mind: A Precautionary Approach to Environmental Uncertainty"
(2013) 4:1 J Human Rights & Environment 79; Scott, "Situating Sarnia", supra note
17; David R Boyd, "No Taps, No Toilets: First Nations and the Constitutional Right
to Water in Canada" (2011) 57:1 McGill LJ 81; Sophie Theriault & David
Robitaille, "Les droits environnementaux dans la Charte des Droits t Libertes de la
Personne du Quebec: Pistes de reflexion" (2011) 57:2 McGill LJ 211; Marguerite
Moore, "THROWing the PreCAUTIONary Principle TO THE WIND:
The Green Energy Act, A Permitting Process in Search of the Precautionary Principle
and the Principle of Subsidiarity" (2010) 74 MPLR (4th) 58; Collins, "Ecologically
Literate", supra note 2; Nickie Vlavianos, "Public Participation and the Disposition of
Oil and Gas Rights in Alberta" (2007) 17:3 J Envtl L & Prac 205; Andrew Gage,
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environmental harm may occur in a variety of scenarios including: where
the state directly engages in environmentally harmful activity (e.g., by
operating a polluting power plant), affirmatively permits pollution (e.g.,
by issuing site-specific Certificates of Approval), sets regulatory and
legislative standards that allow for serious harm to human health, or fails
to enforce relevant environmental standards in circumstances where
exposed citizens have no other means of preventing their exposure.
Charter approaches to environmental protection have the potential
to control discretionary, environmental decision making at all three
levels of the state: the legislative, executive, and judicial. The range of
decisions that could be affected by Charter recognition is very broad. At
the level of statute and regulation, for example, section 7 of the Charter
could require governments to set standards that are protective of human
health generally while section 15 might require that such standards are
responsive to the needs of vulnerable populations in particular (for
example, children, women of child-bearing age, Indigenous populations,
people with disabilities). In the administrative sphere, ministry officials
might be prevented from issuing approvals for additional discharges in a
highly polluted airshed.51 Similarly a minister might be required to refuse
approval of a commercial development that would destroy an Indigenous
sacred site, thus violating section 2(a).51 In the judicial branch, a properly
framed Charter claim could not be defeated by the discretionary
doctrine of justiciability; where claimants have properly framed a
constitutional question, the court must respond.52
"Public Health Hazards and Section 7 of the Charter" (2003) 13 J Envd L & Prac 1.
But see Jason MacLean, "You Say You Want an Environmental Rights Revolution"
(2018) 49:1 Ottawa L Rev 183.
5' This was the argument raised by the Applicants in Lockridge v Ontario (Director,
Ministry of the Environment), 2012 ONSC 2316. See also Collins, "Safeguarding the
Longue Dure", supra note 3.
51 See Natasha Bakht & Lynda M Collins, "The Earth is Our Mother: Freedom of
Religion and the Preservation of Indigenous Sacred Sites in Canada" (2017) 62:3
McGill LJ 777 at 781 [Bakht & Collins, "The Earth is Our Mother"].
52 Friends of the Earth - Les Ami(e)s de la Terre v Canada (Governor in Council), 2009
FCA 297.
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Canadian case law thus far has left open the possibility that
environmental harm could violate the Charter,"3 and a case currently
under way is likely to be the first in which such a finding will be made. In
Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources),'4
the applicants challenge provincial action and inaction in the face of
massive mercury contamination of the community's traditional waters,
the Wabigoon-English River system. The mercury in Grassy Narrows
territory originates from a number of sources, including years of
discharges by a chlor-alkali plant, and is exacerbated by logging, which
releases mercury stored in soils into waterways.55 Grassy Narrows has
become world famous as a hot spot of mercury poisoning. In one study,
more than half of the community members who participated exhibited
signs of serious neurological dysfunction resulting from mercury
exposure.56 In her 2017 report, the Environmental Commissioner of
Ontario summarizes the situation:
After accepting financial responsibility for the mercury contamination,
the Ontario government declined to take action for decades, largely
ignoring the suffering of the Grassy Narrows First Nation and
Wabaseemoong peoples. Over and over, the Ontario government chose
to do nothing. It chose not to remove the [contaminated] sediment, not
to investigate in more detail, not to monitor whether mercury levels were
indeed declining. In other words, it chose to allow the ongoing
poisoning of the communities.
53 See Chalifour, "Environmental Discrimination", supra note 49; Boyd, The Right to a
Healthy Environment, supra note 1 at Appendix C.
54 Toronto 446/15 (filed 1 September 2015, further amended 4 April 2016) (Further
Amended Notice of Application to Divisional Court for Judicial Review) [Grassy
Narrows].
55 See "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 102-06.
56 See Masazumi Harada, et al, "Mercury Pollution in First Nations Groups in Ontario,
Canada: 3 5 Years of Canadian Minamata Disease" (2011) J Minamata Studies 3 at
Table 4.
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It is no coincidence that this environmental devastation primarily affects
Indigenous communities. 17
The immediate targets of the Grassy Narrows initial application for
judicial review are the Ministry of Natural Resources' decision to permit
logging in the contaminated area and the Ministry of Environment and
Climate Change's refusal to do an individual environmental assessment
of the proposed logging."s The Applicants argue that the logging will
release additional mercury into their already contaminated environment
and would violate sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. In particular, they
allege that the increased contamination would violate their rights to life
and security of the person (both physical and psychological) by
increasing their risk of death and serious illness. They allege that the
Applicants' liberty would be violated as the contamination would
deprive them of the freedom to "choose an environment in which to
reside and in which to practice their traditional way of life" 9 Finally, the
section 15 guarantee of equality is engaged as the Applicants are
disproportionately disadvantaged due to their Indigeneity, their
on-reserve status, and, in some cases, their age and gender.
While a full treatment of this case would merit its own article, it is
clear that the Grassy Narrows situation cries out for Charter protection.
A vulnerable, historically marginalized community is subjected to years
of toxic contamination by a succession of governments with knowledge
of the pollution and its effects on human health and the environment.
Technical solutions exist but are delayed by decades. Government then
issues a permit for activity that will worsen the already acute
contamination and refuses even to do an environmental assessment to
evaluate the likely consequences. It seems clear that in such a situation,
the Charter has been violated. As one American court has observed,
17 "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 111 [emphasis in original].
5 Keewatin v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources), 2011 ONSC 4801 (Notice of
Application to Divisional Court for Judicial Review) [Keewatin v Ontario
(Application)].
9 Ibid at 16.
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"[t]o hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no
protection against a government's knowing decision to poison the air its
citizens breathe or the water its citizens drink."60 This would, in effect,
create an environmental exemption from Charter obligations, since the
government would not be constitutionally permitted to inflict arbitrary
physical harm on a marginalized community in any other context. 61
To its credit, the Government of Ontario has now committed to
remedy the contamination in Grassy Narrows. In June of 2017, the
provincial Minister of the Environment and Climate Change committed
more than $85 million to remediate the Wabigoon-English River
system.62 If this remediation is successful, it will protect the health,
spirituality, and culture of future members of the Grassy Narrows First
Nation and Wabaseemoong peoples, restore aquatic ecosystems, and
perhaps even allow commercial and recreational fisheries to re-open.
Ecological restoration such as this reflects a basic premise of the
Canadian social contract: Canadians are both beneficiaries and trustees
of an immense natural trust. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has
held that "our common future, that of every Canadian community,
depends on a healthy environment." 61
The Supreme Court has also blended Charter and administrative law
protections in relation to exercises of administrative discretion under the
rubric of Charter values. As the Court has set out in Dord, Loyola, and
Trinity Western University,64 Charter values are derived from the Charter
rights but may also include broader ideas (such as human dignity) that
are not explicitly mentioned as Charter rights. Where Charter values are
60 Juliana v United States, 217 F Supp (3d) 1224 at 1250 (Or Dist Ct 2016).
61 E.g. a pattern of racist police violence would clearly constitute a Charter violation
even though mercury contamination is arguably even more harmful over a longer
period of time.
62 See "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 110.
63 114957 Canada Lte (Spraytech, Societe d'arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40
at para 1.
64 Dore v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12; Loyola High School v Quebec (AG), 2015
SCC 12; Law Society ofBritish Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32.
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at play, a discretionary decision maker is obligated to balance such values
against the legitimate statutory objectives that the decision maker is
pursuing. If this balancing is not apparent or not reasonable in the
circumstances, a court may invalidate the discretionary decision.
It remains unclear whether the Court could, in time, recognize
environmental protection or ecological sustainability as Charter values,
particularly given the centrality of environmental well-being for concepts
such as the right to life and the security of the person.
Ecological sustainability, however, cannot be seen solely through the
eyes of human rights or self-preservation. At its core, ecological
sustainability also recognizes legal rights and values in non-human life,
whether in wildlife, plant life, or in the building blocks of life (such as
water).61 It is not necessary for our argument to define with precision the
meaning of ecological sustainability.66 Rather, this concept finds its
meaning from a wellspring of sources, including scientific discovery,
traditional Indigenous knowledge and treaties between the Crown and
First Nations, shared social and political commitments expressed
through environmental and wildlife protection, and international treaty
and legal commitments, among others.6 While this evolution in our
understanding of environmental and ecological principles may well lead
to Charter protections or additional accountability through the
expansion of Charter values, there is a further opportunity to guide
65 See David R Boyd, The Rights of Nature: A Legal Revolution That Could Save the
World (Toronto, ECW Press, 2017); Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for
Earth Justice, 2nd ed (White RiverJunction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2011).
66 See generally Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law
and Governance, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2017) [Bosselmann, The Principle of
Sustainability].
6 See e.g. ibid; Fritjof Capra & Ugo Mattei, The Ecology ofLaw: Toward a Legal System
in Tune with Nature and Community (Oakland: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2015);
MacDowell, supra note 34; John Borrows, Canadas Indigenous Constitution
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) [Borrows, Canadas Indigenous
Constitution]; Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International
Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1989).
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administrative discretion through the recognition of ecological
sustainability as an underlying or unwritten constitutional principle.
II. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS TO DISCRETION: THE UCP OF
ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY
In our view, the unwritten constitutional principle (UCP) of ecological
sustainability could act as an important constraint on discretionary,
environmental decision making in Canada. As explained above, the
pervasive presence of administrative discretion has been a major
impediment to the efficacy of environmental law in this country. While
some statutes could be amended to reduce the scope of discretion, Stacey
has argued convincingly that it cannot be abandoned altogether since
environmental systems are in constant flux and emergencies can arise at
any moment.6 As a result, environmental regulators must have the
capacity to be nimble and responsive. Similarly, legislatures need to be
able to craft new environmental statutes and amend existing ones to
respond to changing conditions. At the same time, there is a clear need
for an enforceable ecological "bottom line" 69 if we are to ensure the
sustainability of Canadian society. Recognition of some form of
ecological obligation as an unwritten constitutional principle would
assist courts in supervising the discretionary decisions of environmental
regulators, interpreting environmental legislation, adjudicating
environmental claims under the Charter, and determining environmental
powers under sections 91 and 92. It could arguably provide the
necessary guidance to reorient Canadian environmental law towards its
stated aims.
68 Stacey, "Environmental Emergency" supra note 5 at 987. See also Jocelyn Stacey, The
Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).
69 Pardy, "Holy Grail", supra note 18 at 32, 36-37.
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A. UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 101:
FORM AND FUNCTION
In Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada described
unwritten constitutional principles as follows:
Behind the written word is an historical lineage stretching back through
the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying
constitutional principles. These principles inform and sustain the
constitutional text: they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which
the text is based.... These defining principles function in symbiosis....
Although these underlying principles are not explicitly made part of the
Constitution by any written provision .... it would be impossible to
conceive of our constitutional structure without them. The principles
dictate major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and
are as such its lifeblood.
The principles assist in the interpretation of the text and the delineation
of spheres of jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the
role of our political institutions. Equally important, observance of and
respect for these principles is essential to the ongoing process of
constitutional development and evolution of our Constitution as a
"living tree ".70
These unwritten, or underlying principles are themselves tied to the
rule of law and the function of the courts in demarcating the content,
scope, and role of the rule of law in public decision making. The most
common role that unwritten constitutional principles play is as a guiding
framework, and in some cases a constraint, on the exercise of statutory
discretion. To see how such principles can interact with discretionary
authority, consider the example of Lalonde v Ontario (Commission de
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 49, 51-52, 161 DLR (4th)
385 [Quebec Secession Reference]. Note the recurrence of biological language in this
passage ("symbiosis", "lifeblood", "living tree"). This language arguably reflects an
implicit understanding that all our human structures depend on our biological
survival. In this sense there is no principle more fundamental than that of a healthy
environment.
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restructuration des services de sant). 71 The case concerned a decision of
the Health Services Restructuring Commission, an administrative body
charged with decisions in the context of provincial hospitals. The
decision of this body in relation to the decision to close a francophone
hospital led to a judicial review. The Court found no protection under
the Charter was violated by the decision to close the hospital.
The Court then turned to a consideration of the unwritten
constitutional principle of respect for minorities-including but not
limited to linguistic minorities. The Court reasoned that the principle of
respect for and protection of minorities is a fundamental structural
feature of the Canadian Constitution that both "explains and transcends
the minority rights that are specifically guaranteed in the constitutional
text." 72 This principle was said to infuse the text of the Constitution .71
By enacting legislation that committed Ontario to providing the
services offered at Montfort unless it was "reasonable and necessary" to
limit them, the Commission was obliged to offer a justification that it
was reasonable and necessary to limit the services offered in French by
Montfort to the community.74 The Court found that the Commission's
directions failed to respect the requirements of the Act. In other words,
the UCP of respect for minority rights created a constraint on the
Commission's exercise of its discretion.75 The Court found that the
Commission failed to give serious weight and consideration to the
importance of Montfort as an institution to the survival of the Franco-
Ontarian minority. In its analysis the Court affirmed that UCPs do have
normative force.76 The Court relied on the Provincial Judges
71 (2001), 208 DLR (4th) 577, 56 OR (3d) 505 (CA) [Lalonde cited to DLR].
72 Ibid at para 114.
71 Ibid at para 104.
74 Ibid at paras 164-169.
75 For other examples of cases in which courts employ a UCP to control discretionary
decision making, see Grushman v Ottawa (City) (2000), 29 Admin LR (3d) 41, 15
MPLR (3d) 167 (Ont Div Ct); Gigliotti c Collge des Grands Lacs (Conseil
d'administration) (2005), 76 OR (3d) 561,200 OAC 101 (Ont Div Ct) [Gigliotti].
76 Lalonde, supra note 71 at para 116.
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Remuneration Reference and, in particular, then Chief Justice Lamer's
characterization of the preamble of the Constitution Act of 867:
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give
rise to substantive legal obligations (have "full legal force" as we
described it in the Patriation Reference [Reference re Resolution to Amend
the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753] at p. 845), which constitute
substantive limitations upon government action. These principles may
give rise to very abstract and general obligations, or they may be more
specific and precise in nature. The principles are not merely descriptive,
but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding
upon both courts and governments.
77
In other words, UCPs guide decision makers by requiring the
interpretation of statutes that are most consistent with the UCPs. 78
UCPs also elevate the principles they contain to a priority beyond other
(and potentially competing) policy priorities. Both considerations are
particularly salient in the environmental context where statutory
provisions are often open to disparate interpretations, and there is almost
always an economic argument against regulation.
79
Typically, unwritten constitutional principles do not form the basis,
on their own, for findings that an inconsistent statutory provision is
invalid."° However, the Supreme Court has left open the possibility for
77 Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 70 at para 54, cited in ibid at 116.
78 See e.g. Wilder v Ontario (Securities Commission) (2000), 47 OR (3d) 361, 184 DLR
(4th) 165 (Ont Div Ct); Giroux v Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Business
Services) (2005), 75 OR (3d) 759, 199 OAC 153 (Ont Div Ct); Canadian Food
Inspection Agency v Forum des maires de la Peninsule acadienne, 2004 FCA 263;
Gigliotti, supra note 75; Fderation Franco-Tnoise c Canada (PG), 2006 NWTSC
20; TB c Quebec (Ministre de l'Education), 2007 QCCA 1112; HN c Quebec
(Ministre de l'Education), 2007 QCCA 1111; Kilrich Industries Ltd v Halotier, 2007
YKCA 12.
79 See e.g. Friends of the Earth v Canada (Governor in Council), 2008 FC 1183; Kyoto
Protocol Implementation Act, SC 2007, c 30, as repealed by Jobs, Growth, and Long-
Term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19, s 699.
80 See Vincent Kazmierski, "Draconian But Not Despotic: the 'Unwritten' Limits to
Parliamentary Sovereignty in Canada" (2010) 41:2 Ottawa L Rev 245 at 249.
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these principles to form the basis for a finding of invalidity.,, In his
empirical review of the use of UCPs by Canadian courts, Dominic
DiFruscio reports that Canadian courts used UCPs to invalidate
legislation 14 times between 1982 and 2014, while they relied on UCPs
to uphold legislation 15 times during the same period.12
To summarize, UCPs are foundational principles underlying our
Constitution that are binding on courts and governments and can, on
some occasions, influence outcomes in constitutional litigation. We
argue that ecological sustainability is one such principle.
B. THE CASE FOR AN ECOLOGICAL UCP: SUSTAINING THE
LIVING TREE
For almost a century, the idea of our constitution as a "living tree" has
been "the most enduring constitutional metaphor in Canada.""3 The
living tree doctrine has allowed our constitutional law to keep pace with
changes in Canadian society. But the metaphor also acts as a salutary
reminder of the fundamental hierarchy between rule of law and rule of
nature. Without a viable environment, there can be no legal system;
nature literally constitutes law (and every other human institution). It is
then perhaps unsurprising that ecological sustainability clearly meets the
criteria for an unwritten constitutional principle as articulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada.14 Our environment sustains every aspect of
81 See Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia vBritish Columbia (AG), 2014
SCC 59 at 39-41.
82 Dominic DiFruscio, "Patriation, Politics and Power: The State of Balance between
the Supreme Court and Parliament after Thirty Years of the Charter" (2014) 8 JPPL
29 at 57.
83 Dustin W Klaudt, "Can Canada's 'Living Tree' Constitution and Lessons from
Foreign Climate Litigation Seed Climate Justice and Remedy Climate Change?"
(2018) 31:3 J Envtl L & Prac 185 at 187. See also Jean Leclair, "Invisibility, Wilful
Blindness and Impending Doom: The Future (If Any) of Canadian Federalism", in
Peter John Loewen et al (eds), Policy Transformation in Canada: Is the Past Prologue
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming in May 2019].
84 See Shalin M Sugunasiri, "Public Accountability and Legal Pedagogy: Studies in
Constitutional Law" (2008) 2 JPPL 93 (for an excellent analytical framework for
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the Canadian state, including the Constitution. It is the lifeblood of our
society and our legal system. Indeed, all of the UCPs that have been
recognized thus far depend upon a healthy environment. At the risk of
stating the obvious, it also clear that "observance of and respect for
[ecological sustainability] is essential to the ongoing process of
constitutional development and evolution.", s  Without it, the
Constitution would become "self-defeating" ;16 to extend the metaphor, it
would be a dying tree rather than a living one.
Writing extra-judicially, Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was)
has characterized "unwritten constitutional principles [as] unwritten
norms that are essential to a nation's history, identity, values[,] and legal
system." 7 Ecological sustainability also meets this definition. Jean Leclair
notes that "protection of health and the environment represent two
values perceived by many as traditionally and typically 'Canadian'
values[;] they also have the singular quality of enabling us to transcend
the issues that constantly divide us .... They are values about which we
can all agree."'
Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner, and Benjamin J. Richardson
elaborate:
According to public opinion polls, Canadians are among the staunchest
environmentalists in the world.... [T]hese apparently strong
environmental values among Canadians [can be attributed] to the
country's relatively vast areas of wilderness and the fact that the
assessing new UCPs. Ecological sustainability seems to comport with Sugunasiri's
criteria).
Secession Reference, supra note 70 at para 52.
86 The Rt Hon Beverley McLachlin, "Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is
Going On?" (Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lecture delivered at the Victoria University
of Wellington Law School, 1 December 2005), (2006) 4:2 NZJPIL 147 at 163.
17 Ibid at 149.
88 Jean Leclair, "The Supreme Court, the Environment, and the Construction of
National Identity: R. v. Hydro-Quebec" (1998) 4:2 Rev Const Stud 372 at 378-79.
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environment has been a seminal influence in Canada's art, literature, and
other cultural domains. 9
Environmental stewardship also has solid historical foundations in
the multi-juridical edifice of Canadian law. In the West, the public trust
doctrine has imposed on governments an obligation to steward the
natural environment for present and future generations since Roman
times. 9°  The French Civil Code historically recognized public
stewardship of water bodies" and a similar doctrine survived into
English Common Law.92 Indeed, the founding document in the
Anglo-Canadian constitutional tradition, the Magna Carta, was
complemented by a companion instrument known as the "Charter of the
Forest", which guaranteed English free men their rights to access to vital
natural resources, without which some the civil and political rights
contained in the Magna Carta would have been meaningless93 The legal
imperative of ecological sustainability has an even longer history in
"Indigenous legal traditions [that] are among Canadas unwritten
normative principles and, with common and civil law, can be said to
'form the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada"'' 94 Recognition
of an environmental UCP would reflect the importance many
'9 Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & BenjaminJ Richardson; "What Ever Happened to
Canadian Environmental Law?" (2010) 37:4 Ecology LQ 981 at 1028.
90 See TC Sandars, The Institutes ofJustinian (1876), Book II, Title I ("[b]y the law of
nature these things are common to mankind-the air, running water, the sea" at
158), cited in British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at
para 74.
91 See British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at para 75 [BC v
Canadian Forest Products].
92 See Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, translated by Samuel E Thorne
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1968) vol 2 ("[b]y natural law these are common
to all: running water, air, the sea and the shores of the sea. All rivers and ports are
public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons" at 39-40).
9' See Sir William Blackstone, The Great Charter and Charter of the Forest (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1759).
94 Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution, supra note 67 at 108.
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Indigenous legal orders place on respect for the environment, thus
simultaneously advancing the goals of reconciliation and sustainability.9s
As Borrows points out, "[t]he Constitution, though a legal document,
serves as a framework for life and for political action"]6 It seems clear that
a legal framework for life must ensure the protection of the biophysical
environment on which life depends.
While the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet had the
opportunity to consider whether ecological sustainability is an unwritten
principle of the Constitution, its jurisprudence has cast environmental
protection in quasi-constitutional terms. 97 The Court summarized its
own holdings on this point in British Columbia v Canadian Forest
Products Ltd:98
As the Court observed in Canada (Procureure Generale) c.
Hydro-Qubec, legal measures to protect the environment 'relate to a
public purpose of superordinate importance'.... In R. v. Canadian
Pacific Ltd., 'stewardship of the natural environment' was described as a
fundamental value .... Still more recently, in 114957 Canada Lte
9' See ibid ("The land's sentience is a fundamental principle of Anishinabek law," and
contributes to "a multiplicity of citizenship rights and responsibilities for
Anishinabek people and the Earth" at 243-44); James (Sakej) Youngblood
Henderson, "First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada: The Mikmaq Model"
(1995) 23 Man LJ 1 (noting that Mikmaq law extends legal personality to non-
human members of the natural world and imposes obligations on humans towards
their fellow beings at 19-21); Jessica Clogg et al, "Indigenous Legal Traditions and
the Future of Environmental Governance in Canada" (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac
227; Benjamin J Richardson, "The Ties that Bind: Indigenous Peoples and
Environmental Governance" in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil
(eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart
Publishing: Oxford, 2009) 337 at 337-70.
96 Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution, supra note 67 at 200.
97 See generally Jerry V DeMarco, "The Supreme Court of Canada's Recognition of
Fundamental Environmental Values: What Could Be Next in Canadian
Environmental Law ?" (2007) 17:3 J Envtl L & Prac 159.
9' Supra note 9 1.
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(Spray-Tech, Societe d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Ville), the Court reiterated at
para. 1 :
[O]ur common future, that of every Canadian community,
depends on a healthy environment.... This Court has recognized
that '(e)veryone is aware that individually and collectively, we are
responsible for preserving the natural environment
environmental protection [has] emerged as afundamental value in
Canadian society'.99
In Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd,1"' the majority of the Supreme
Court adopted the following passage from the Law Reform Commission
of Canadas report, Crimes Against the Environment:
[A] fundamental and widely shared value is indeed seriously
contravened by some environmental pollution, a value which we will
refer to as the right to a safe environment. To some extent, this right and
value appears to be new and emerging, but in part because it is an
extension of existing and very traditional rights and values already
protected by criminal law, its presence and shape even now are largely
discernible. Among the new strands of this fundamental value are, it
may be argued, those such as quality of life, and stewardship of the
natural environment. At the same time, traditional values as well have
simply expanded and evolved to include the environment now as an area
and interest of direct and primary concern. Among these values
fundamental to the purposes and protections of criminal law are the
sanctity of life, the inviolability and integrity of persons, and the
protection of human life and health. It is increasingly understood that
certain forms and degrees of environmental pollution can directly or
99 Ibid, at para 7 [emphasis added, citations omitted]. See also R v Vholesale Travel
Group Inc, [1991] 3 SCR 154, 4 OR (3d) 799 ("[rlegulatory legislation is essential to
the functioning of our society and to the protection of the public. It responds to the
compelling need to protect the health and safety of the members of our society and
to preserve our fragile environment" at 254).
100 [1995] 2SCR 1031, 24 OR (3d) 454.
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indirectly, sooner or later, seriously harm or endanger human life and
human health.1"1
Throughout this robust body of dicta from the Supreme Court of
Canada, one finds language suggestive of constitutional status (e.g.
"superordinate" and "fundamental"). The observation that "everyone is
aware " 12 that we are responsible for environmental preservation suggests
that this underlying environmental obligation is both implicit and
incontestable. Similarly, if "our common future ... depends on a healthy
environment",1"3 then preserving such an environment must be a
fundamental function of the state, that is, an unwritten normative
principle supporting the written constitution.
Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) suggests that UCPs may
derive in part from natural law.1°4 In the natural law paradigm, the
legitimacy of human-made law is measured by the extent to which it
comports with a transcendent, non-derogable moral law. In the context
of our ongoing ecological crisis, it seems logical to measure the
legitimacy of positive laws by the extent to which they comport with the
non-derogable laws of nature. The supreme court of the Philippines
eloquently captured this idea in its celebrated decision in Minors Oposa, a
case concerning the environmental rights of future generations:
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation [,] the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of
101 Ibd at para 56 [emphasis added, citation omitted]. This passage was quoted again in
Hydro Quebec, supra note 46, in which the Court upheld the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999, SC 1999, c 33 as a valid exercise of federal
power.
102 Supra note 91 at para 7.
103 BC v Canadian Forest Products, supra note 91 at para 7.
104 McLachlin, supra note 86 at 149-51.
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fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind) 5
The US District Court for the District of Oregon cited Minors Oposa
when denying a motion to dismiss the recent lawsuit brought by a
coalition of young people who argue that government inaction on
climate change has violated their right to substantive due process under
the American Constitution.1°6 In holding that a stable climate might
constitute an "unenumerated fundamental right",1 7 the court recognized
that "a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation 'of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."108 In the
Canadian legal order, interests that lie at the foundation of our society
qualify for recognition as unwritten constitutional principles.
The logic of these decisions seems inescapable; physical
self-preservation is a fundamental imperative for all human beings, and
societal preservation is a fundamental imperative for the state. If our
constitutional text fails to protect the ecosystems on which all of the
enumerated rights and powers delineated therein depend, it must be
because the principle of environmental protection is so fundamental as
to be both implicit and obvious, much like the principle of
democracy-a basic, underlying structure that supports every other
provision in the written Constitution.
C. How WOULD AN ECOLOGICAL UCP CONTROL
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRETION?
The defining quality of discretion is exercising judgment and making
choices among possible actions envisioned within the statutory scheme.
In theory, the UCP of ecological sustainability could ensure that where a
"The Philippines: Supreme Court Decision in Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)" (1994) 33:1 ILM 173
at 187 [Minors Oposa].
106 Juliana v United States, supra note 60.
107 Ibid at 1249.
108 Ibid at 1250 [citations omitted].
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judgment call involves possible interpretations that will preserve
ecological integrity or that will undermine it, the decision maker would
be obliged to choose from among the environmentally protective
options. While balancing competing interests and possible interpretive
paths would remain a key role for public officials, the constitutional
thumb would be on the scale of protecting and preserving environmental
well-being. This is, of course, an optimistic scenario, but we believe it is
also achievable.
There are at least two possible pathways of influence for the UCP of
ecological sustainability: governmental and judicial. Internally, one can
hope that governments that respect the rule of law would take the UCP
of ecological sustainability seriously and re-shape their policies
accordingly. Legislatures could take such a constitutional norm as a point
of departure for drafting environmental statutes that more closely
constrain discretionary decision making, imposing an ecological bottom
line. The executive branch of government could develop, revise, and
implement environmental regulations with the goal of achieving both
the immediate protection of human health and the long-term
preservation of natural systems that support the ongoing existence of
humans, plants, and non-human animals. However, while constitutional
provisions certainly help to shape governmental culture, it would be
naive to expect consistent compliance. As with other constitutional
provisions, courts would undoubtedly be called upon to enforce the
UCP of ecological sustainability where governments fail to respect it.
For the UCP of ecological sustainability to make a difference, the
judiciary would need to articulate and give legal effect to the UCP
within contexts of judicial review. From the judicial perspective, this
UCP would be recognized as an aspect of what constitutes intra vires
regulations, reasonable exercises of discretion, reconciliation enhancing
Crown action, and constitutionally valid legislative provisions.
Constitutional principles are not static features of the Constitution, but
rather take their shape and form from social, political and cultural
evolution. For example, the protection of minorities may have begun as a
response to linguistic difference in the Canada of 1867, but had become
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a far broader idea by the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982.1°9
Recognizing ecological sustainability as a UCP builds on long-standing
commitments and responds to current (and future) challenges.
If the UCP of ecological sustainability is taken seriously by both
governments and courts, the impacts could be significant; recognition of
an ecological UCP could create real improvements in the lives of
ordinary Canadians. In Grassy Narrows, for example, the UCP of
ecological sustainability could have accelerated much-needed
remediation of mercury contamination by years or decades. In
Aamjiwnaang, an ecological UCP might require the Ministry of the
Environment to address the cumulative effects of multiple air emissions
rather than treating each polluter as if it were the only one. In the
fisheries context, regulators might, in turn, be required to desist from
issuing permits where the long-term sustainability of a given fishery is in
peril. In toxics regulation (for example, through the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act), a UCP of ecological sustainability would
require the government to aggressively pursue the goal of zero discharge
of persistent toxic chemicals-that is, those that stay in the environment
indefinitely. In all cases, an ecological UCP would require Canadian
governments and decision-making officials at all levels to become
ecologically literate and to regulate ecological realities rather than
legal fictions.
The foregoing instrumental considerations strengthen our previous
argument that ecological sustainability should be recognized as a UCP
simply because it clearly meets the definition of that concept as
developed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Whether one views such
recognition as a good thing depends largely upon one's views of UCPs as
a category,110 or indeed of constitutions as a whole."' l Some observers
109 See Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 70 at paras 79-82.
110 For a range of perspectives on this, see e.g. Heather Maclvor, "Unwritten
Constitutional Principles" (2012) 6 JPPL 339; Kazmierski, supra note 80;
Sugunasiri, supra note 84; Warren J Newman, "'Grand Entrance Hall, Back Door or
Foundation Stone' The Role of Constitutional Principles in Construing and
Applying the Constitution of Canada" (2001) 14:2 SCLR 197; Sujit Choudhry &
Robert Howse, "Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference"
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criticize UCPs as anti-democratic or draconian,112 while others view
them as ambiguous or even useless.113 However, as explained above,
UCPs have been pivotal in a small body of case law, including several
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Depending on the scope and
implications of a given lawsuit, even one victory based on an ecological
UCP could have profound benefits for Canadian society. Climate
litigation, for example, is likely to come before Canadian courts with
increasing frequency in future years, framed in a variety of administrative
and constitutional theories.114 As courts grapple with highly complex and
contested legal arguments on both sides, and confront the temptation to
dismiss these suits and send the ball back to the political court, it may be
that recognition of an ecological UCP tips the scale in favour of
responsible judicial intervention.
Beyond the nuts and bolts of litigation tactics, "[t] here is also a vital
normative role for constitutions, which express the deepest, most
(2000) 13:2 Can JL & Juris 143; Marc Cousineau, "LAffaire Montfort:
Confirmation de la Valeur Des Principes Fondamentaux de la Constitution" (2002)
13 NJCL 485; Patrick J Monahan, "The Public Policy of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Secession Reference" (1999)11 NJCL 65.
... See e.g. DiFruscio, supra note 82; Chris Jeffords & Lanse Minkler, "Do
Constitutions Matter? The Effect of Constitutional Environmental Rights
Provisions on Environmental Performance" (2016) 69:2 Kyklos 294; Xavier de
Vanssay & ZA Spindler, "Freedom and Growth: Do Constitutions Matter?" (1994)
78:3-4 Public Choice 359.
112 See e.g. Jean Leclair & Yves-Marie Morrisette, "L'Indpendance Judicaire et la Cour
Supreme: Reconstruction Historique Douteuse et Theorie Constitutionnelle de
Complaisance" (1998) 36:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 485 at 490; Jean-Frangois Gaudreault-
DesBiens, "The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial Arbitration of
Conflicting Narratives About Law, Democracy, and Identity" (1998) 23:4 Vermont
L Rev 793 at 839; Kazmierski, supra note 80; Robin Elliot, "References, Structural
Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada's Constitution" (2001)
80: 1&2 Can Bar Rev 67.
113 See e.g. Jean Leclair, "Canada's Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles"
27:2 Queens LJ 389.
114 See e.g. Klaudt, supra note 83; Chalifour & Earle, supra note 49.
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cherished values of a society.""x5 Unwritten constitutional principles
should carry particular normative force because they stand at the very
foundation of our legal order. The educative value of constitutional
principles is especially relevant in the environmental context since it is
widely recognized that the journey from crisis to sustainability is as
much an intellectual, ethical, and social process as it is a technical, legal,
and economic one.1 1 6 Like law generally, constitutional principles can
serve to encourage "a powerful sense of... interdependence, and shared
responsibility"117 At a more mundane level, the UCP of ecological
sustainability can also animate education and training, as well as the
development of policy, guidelines and practices to interpret and apply
the environmental regulations and statutes.
Thus, in addition to its impact on specific instances of discretionary
decision making, we believe recognition of ecological sustainability as a
UCP will have a broader impact on public discourse and social action in
Canada, just as respect for other constitutional principles, such as the
protection of minorities and the promotion of both democracy and the
rule of law, have become internalized as shared aspirations across many
institutions, organizations, and communities. The impact on Canada's
constitutional culture (and on Canadas ongoing contribution to the
global conversation on constitutionalism and environmental protection)
may be the most significant and enduring legacy in the recognition of
the UCP of ecological sustainability.
"1 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of
Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012)
at 4.
116 See James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the
Environment, and Crossingfrom Crisis to Sustainability (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2008); Capra & Mattei, supra note 67; Douglas A Kysar, "Law, Environment
and Vision" (2003) 97:2 Nw U L Rev 675. See also Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic"
in Donald VanDeVeer & Christine Pierce, eds, The Environmental Ethics & Policy
Book, 3d ed (Toronto: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2003) 215 ("[n]o important
change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our
intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions" at 218).
117 Speth, ibid at 225.
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While we argue that ecological sustainability is-and ought to be
recognized as-a UCP, scholars and courts will need to elaborate on the
scope and contours of such a principle over time, given its expansive
potential (although no more expansive than other UCPs such as the rule
of law and democracy).11 Like other UCPs, the meaning of ecological
sustainability will evolve with changes in the collective consciousness in
Canada. Unlike other UCPs, ecological sustainability is rooted both in
moral commitment and in scientific discovery. In that sense, it is a target
that will become increasingly clear as science advances over time. For
example, our scientific understanding of the causes and consequences of
climate change has evolved with the emergence of increasingly
compelling data over the years. While the status of ecological
sustainability as a UCP may be static, its scope will change with our
knowledge of sustainability itself and with the ethical evolution in our
understanding of appropriate relationships between human beings and
the rest of the natural world.
RECONCILIATION
The constitutional context of ecological sustainability as a UCP is
closely tied to the constitutional goals of reconciliation with First
Nations and Indigenous peoples. As the 2018 report of the
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario observes, "[e]nvironmental
justice must be part of the.., government's pursuit of reconciliation with
Indigenous people."119 It is now well established that state-sponsored
environmental harm can violate recognized Aboriginal Rights and
Aboriginal Title under section 35 of the Constitution. The right to hunt,
for example, includes a right to preservation of adequate habitat to
... See AE Dick Howard, "The Indeterminacy of Constitutions" (1996) 31:2 Wake
Forest L Rev 383 ("[a]ny principle general enough to be a norm informing an entire
constitutional system is likely to resist ready explication" at 389).
119 "Good Choices, Bad Choices", supra note 6 at 99.
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support populations of traditional prey species. 12 The right to "to carry
on the fishery as formerly" was found to preclude the approval of a
marina that would have destroyed shellfish habitat. 121 Fishing rights have
also led the Federal Court to impose a moratorium on the herring fishery
in BC when scientific uncertainty made it impossible to predict whether
continued fishing could lead to a collapse in stocks.122 The Supreme
Court has even interpreted environmental sustainability as a
fundamental aspect of Aboriginal title, holding in Tsilhqotin Nation that
"incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land" 123 and
further that Aboriginal title lands cannot be put to uses that would
"destroy the ability of the land to sustain future generations of
Aboriginal peoples."124 The environmental rights of Indigenous peoples
are thus firmly rooted in Canadian constitutional law-at least in theory.
In practice, environmental protections for Indigenous peoples have often
been illusory.
Much of the litigation around section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982, has concerned the duty to consult and accommodate, and has
focused on the procedures by which governments exercise discretion
around the use of land that is subject to treaties or unresolved Indigenous
land claims. This duty, in turn, flows from the Crown's fiduciary
obligations to Aboriginal Peoples (as defined by section 35) and the
Honour of the Crown. For example, in the opening words of First
Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon,125Justice Karakatsanis stated that
"expressions of partnership between nations, modern treaties play a
120 See generally Lynda M Collins & Meghan Murtha, "Indigenous Environmental
Rights in Canada: The Right to Conservation Implicit in Treaty and Aboriginal
Rights to Hunt, Fish and Trap" (2010) 47:4 Alta L Rev 959.
121 Tsawout Indian Band v Saanichton Marina Ltd (1989), 57 DLR (4th) 161 at 167,
36 BCLR (2d) 79 (CA).
122 Haida Nation v Canada (Minister ofFisheries and Oceans), 2015 FC 290.
123 Tsilhqotin Nation vBritish Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 86 [Tsilhqotin Nation].
124 Ibidatpara 121.
125 2017 SCC 58 [NachoNyakDun].
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critical role in fostering reconciliation. Through [section] 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, they have assumed a vital place in our
constitutional fabric."126
The duty to consult and accommodate was first set out in detail in
Haida Nation (2004),127 and is based on the following rationale:
Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans
came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims
with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others,
notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be
determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the
Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation.
While this process continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to
consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.... 121
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a final
legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights
guaranteed by s 35.(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This process of
reconciliation flows from the Crown's duty of honourable dealing
toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the Crown's
assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and defacto control of
land and resources that were formerly in the control of that people. As
stated inMitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 SCC 33, at
para. 9, "[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty] arose an obligation to treat
aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to protect them
from exploitation". 129
126 Ibid at para 1.
127 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation
(2004)].
128 Ibid at para 25.
129 Ibid at para 32 [emphasis removed].
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Many of the cases elaborating the duty to consult have arisen against
the backdrop of environmental discretion. For instance, in Nacho Nyak
Dun, the Court considered the implications for environmental
protections of a modern comprehensive treaty between Yukon and First
Nations. The Court characterized the case as a judicial review of a land
use plan developed according to the terms of a treaty, and held that the
provisions of this treaty required a more collaborative process
to the management of a watershed than that engaged in by the
Yukon Government.
The dispute grew out of a process to govern the Peel Watershed in
Yukon. In 2004, a commission was established to develop a regional land
use plan for the Peel Watershed. Following an extensive process, the
Commission submitted its Recommended Peel Watershed Regional
Land Use Plan to Yukon and the affected First Nations. Near the end of
the approval process, and after the Commission had released a Final
Recommended Plan, Yukon proposed and adopted a final plan that
made substantial changes to increase access to and development of
the region.
Justice Karakatsanis, writing for the Court, noted that in a judicial
review concerning the implementation of modern treaties, a court
should focus on the legality of the impugned decision, rather than closely
supervise the conduct of the parties at each stage of the treaty
relationship. She observed that "reconciliation often demands judicial
forbearance",13 notwithstanding that under section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, modern treaties are constitutional documents,
and courts must continue to perform an important role in safeguarding
the rights they enshrine.
The Court held that while Yukon had the power to make minor
modifications to land use plans, it did not have the authority to make the
extensive changes that it made to the Final Recommended Plan for the
Peel Watershed, and that the trial judge therefore appropriately quashed
Yukon's approval of its plan and returned the matter to a stage of further
consultation. While Yukon was not necessarily constrained in pursuing
130 Supra note 125 at para 33.
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the development projects to which the revised land use plan was
directed, it had failed to act honourably within the requirements of
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in the process it undertook to
finalize this plan.
Even the modest procedural obligations of Canadian governments
affirmed in Nacho Nyak Dun, however, seemed uncertain in the
companion cases, Chippewas of the Thames and Clyde River.131 Haida
Nation (2004) and subsequent case law left open the extent and contexts
in which Canadian governments could delegate the duty to consult and
accommodate to regulatory agencies, tribunals, and other arm's length
executive branch entities.
In Chippewas of the Thames, the Supreme Court addresses whether
the regulatory process established by the National Energy Board (NEB)
in relation to the approval of a pipeline project could satisfy the duty to
consult and accommodate. The NEB issued notice to Indigenous
groups, including the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, informing
them of the project, the NEB's role, and the NEB's upcoming hearing
process. The Chippewas were granted funding to participate in the
process, and they filed evidence and delivered oral argument delineating
their concerns that the project would increase the risk of pipeline
ruptures and spills, which could adversely impact their use of the land.
The NEB eventually approved the project and was satisfied that
potentially affected Indigenous groups had received adequate
information and had the opportunity to share their views. The NEB also
found that potential project impacts on the rights and interests of
Aboriginal groups would likely be minimal and would be
appropriately mitigated.
Writing for the Court, Justices Karakatsanis and Brown held that the
NEB's process satisfied the duty to consult and accommodate. The
Court found that as a statutory body with the delegated executive
responsibility to make a decision that could adversely affect Aboriginal
131 Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41
[Chippewas of the Thames]; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017
SCC 40 [Clyde River].
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and treaty rights, the NEB acted on behalf of the Crown in approving
Enbridge's application. Consequently, the Crown, through the NEB, had
an obligation to consult. The Crown, in discharging its duty, may rely on
steps taken by an administrative body to fulfill its duty to consult so long
as the agency possesses the statutory powers to do what the duty to
consult requires in the particular circumstances. To discharge its
constitutional duty in this way, it must be made clear to the affected
Indigenous group that the Crown is relying on this arm's length body to
satisfy the consultation process, as the Court found was the case in the
context of the NEB and the Chippewas of the Thames.
Even taking the strength of the Chippewas' claim and the seriousness
of the potential impact on the claimed rights at their highest, the
consultation undertaken in this case was clearly adequate in the eyes of
the Court. Potentially affected Indigenous groups were given early notice
of the NEB's hearing and were invited to participate in the process. The
Chippewas accepted the invitation and appeared before the NEB. They
were aware that the NEB was the final decision maker. Moreover, they
understood that no other Crown entity was involved in the process for
the purposes of carrying out consultation. The Court concluded that the
circumstances of this case made it sufficiently clear to the Chippewas
that the NEB process was intended to constitute Crown consultation
and accommodation.
In the companion case of Clyde River,13 2 which involved similar issues
and a similar decision-making process through the NEB, the outcome
was the opposite. The proponents in Clyde River applied to the NEB to
conduct offshore seismic testing for oil and gas in Nunavut. The
proposed testing could negatively affect the treaty rights of the Inuit of
Clyde River, who opposed the seismic testing, alleging that the duty to
consult had not been fulfilled in relation to it. The NEB granted the
requested authorization. It concluded that the proponents made
sufficient efforts to consult with Aboriginal groups and that Aboriginal
groups had an adequate opportunity to participate in the NEB's process.
132 Supra note 131.
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The NEB also concluded that the testing was unlikely to cause
significant adverse environmental effects.
Applying a similar test as Chippewas of the Thames, in this case, the
Court quashed the decision of the NEB because it failed to meet the
standard of adequate consultation. Once again writing for the Court,
Karakatsanis and Brown JJ found that when affected Indigenous groups
have squarely raised concerns about Crown consultation with the NEB,
the NEB must address those concerns in reasons. In this case, the Court
found that the NEB's inquiry was misdirected. The NEB considered the
environmental impact of the proposed project, but the consultative
inquiry should have been on the Indigenous group's section 35 rights.
Here, the NEB gave no consideration to the source of the Inuit's treaty
rights, nor to the impact of the proposed testing on those rights. Second,
although the Crown relied on the processes of the NEB as fulfilling its
duty to consult, that was not made clear to the Inuit. Finally, the NEB
made available only limited opportunities for participation and
consultation by Inuit groups (for example, there were no oral hearings or
participant funding, as in the Chippewas of the Thames).
While the Court's decision in Clyde River represented a significant
victory for the appellants in the case, which should not be minimized,
this judgment, along with the Chippewas of the Thames, arguably
represents a step backwards (or at least sideways) in the journey toward
reconciliation. Emerging from the Crown's fiduciary obligations and the
Honour of the Crown, the duty to consult and accommodate was
elaborated in Haida Nation (2004) (and the companion case Taku
River)133 as a hopeful initiative to ensure section 35 rights were top of
mind as the Crown makes decisions affecting territories subject to
Indigenous claims x3 4 In light of these most recent decisions, it appears
that the Crown need not design processes with Indigenous rights in
133 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
2004 SCC 74 [Taku River].
114 See e.g. Dwight Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal
Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009).
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mind at all. Rather, as long as existing statutory bodies such as the NEB
have mandates to consult, and the Crown provides notice to affected
Indigenous groups that consultations by the arm's length body will
constitute the Crown's consultation, the Crown can rely on such bodies
to discharge their constitutional duties, even where these bodies do no
more than permit Indigenous groups to participate on similar terms to
all other stakeholders. In other words, the duty to consult and
accommodate under section 35 is fast becoming just another version of
procedural fairness, and the Court seems to have retrenched from the
initial position expressed by Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was)
in Haida Nation (2004) that "[t]he honour of the Crown cannot
be delegated13
These cases also signify that Indigenous peoples' distinct perspective
on environmental protection and ecological sustainability will play no
role in elaborating the obligations under section 35. 136 This limitation of
section 35 was highlighted in the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource
Operations) 137 This decision involved a challenge to a proposed ski resort
development in the traditional territories of the Ktunaxa First Nation in
BC (a place known as Qat'muk, which has spiritual significance as home
to Grizzly Bear Spirit, a principal spirit within Ktunaxa religious beliefs
and cosmology).
The Ktunaxa were consulted about this proposed development and
raised concerns about the impact of the project, which led to some
modifications to the proposal and additional consultations. After these
further consultations, the Ktunaxa adopted the position that
accommodation was impossible because the project would drive Grizzly
Bear Spirit from Qat'muk and therefore irrevocably impair their
religious beliefs and practices. The BC Government declared that
reasonable consultation had occurred and approved the project.
13 Haida Nation (2004), supra note 127 at para 53.
136 See generally John Borrows, "Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations,
Environmental Planning, and Democracy" (1997) 47:4 U Toronto LJ 417 at 425.
13 2017 SCC 54 [Ktunaxa].
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Writing for a majority of the Court, McLachlin CJC (as she then
was) and Rowe J, held that the Minister's decision did not violate the
Ktunaxa's section 2(a) right to freedom of religion, as their concern was
an object of belief, not the Ktunaxa's freedom to hold their beliefs or
their freedom to manifest those beliefs. 13, The juxtaposition between the
freedom to believe and the objects of that belief flows from an expressly
non-Indigenous approach to spirituality, as opposed to an approach
attempting to reconcile Western and Indigenous spiritual approaches or
between Western and Indigenous law. 139
Beyond the religious freedom aspect of the decision, the Court also
considered the Minister's decision that the Crown had met its duty to
consult and accommodate under the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court
noted that the Minister's decision to approve a project for development
is entitled to deference and that review of "an administrative decision
under [section] 35 does not decide the constitutional issue de novo for
itself. Rather, [the court asks] whether the administrative decision
maker's finding on the issue was reasonable." 14  That is, had the
Crown reasonably met the duty to consult and accommodate in
these circumstances?
Framed in this way, the Court need only conclude that it was
reasonable that the Minister determined that the consultation and
accommodation process was adequate. A reasonable standard creates a
lower threshold for a minister's decision, which need be neither
appropriate nor correct, and allows that a minister's determination
represents only one of the possible findings that could be made in the
circumstances. The Court further noted that Aboriginal rights must be
proven by "tested evidence"; they cannot be established as an incident of
administrative law proceedings that centre on the adequacy of
138 Ibd at para 75.
139 See Sarah Morales, "Qat'muk: Ktunaxa and the Religious Freedom of Indigenous
Canadians" in Dwight Newman, ed, Religious Freedom and Communities (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2016); Bakht & Collins, "The Earth is Our Mother", supra note 51.
14' Ktunaxa, supra note 137 at para 82.
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consultation and accommodation.141 In other words, the subject matter
was whether the consultations were adequate, not whether the impact on
the affected Indigenous community justified objecting to the project.
For Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice Rowe,
consultation and accommodation will not resolve underlying claims, but
rather constitute the best available legal tool. They observe:
The Ktunaxa reply that they must have relief now, for if development
proceeds Grizzly Bear Spirit will flee Qat'muk long before they are able
to prove their claim or establish it under the B.C. treaty process. We are
not insensible to this point. But the solution is not for courts to make
far-reaching constitutional declarations in the course of judicial review
proceedings incidental to, and ill-equipped to determine, Aboriginal
rights and title claims. Injunctive relief to delay the project may be
available. Otherwise, the best that can be achieved in the uncertain
interim while claims are resolved is to follow a fair and respectful process
and work in good faith toward reconciliation. Claims should be
identified early in the process and defined as clearly as possible. In most
cases, this will lead to agreement and reconciliation. Where it does not,
mitigating potential adverse impacts on the asserted right ultimately
requires resolving questions about the existence and scope of unsettled
claims as expeditiously as possible. For the Ktunaxa, this may seem
unsatisfactory, indeed tragic. But in the difficult period between claim
assertion and claim resolution, consultation and accommodation,
imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal tools in the
reconciliation basket. 142
The Court held that the record in Ktunaxa supported the
reasonableness of the Minister's conclusion that the section 35
obligation of consultation and accommodation had been met, and
underscored that Indigenous peoples would have no constitutional veto
over projects on environmental, spiritual, or other grounds. Ktunaxa
demonstrates the limits of a framework of consultation and
accommodation. Ultimately, where a First Nation or Indigenous
141 Ibid at para 77.
142 Ibid at para 86.
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community is simply opposed to a project, as here, the framework tends
to favour the Crown as long as it demonstrates that it appreciates the
objections and makes some modifications to the project in light of the
objection. The Court concluded in this context, for example, that while
the Minister did not offer the ultimate accommodation demanded by
the Ktunaxa-complete rejection of the ski resort project-the Crown
met its obligation to consult and accommodate by modifying the
proposal. As the Court expressly notes, section 35 guarantees a process,
not a particular result or a veto, and that where adequate consultation
has occurred, environmental discretion may be exercised with or without
consent of affected Indigenous communities, and whether or not the
project in question comports with the goal of ecological sustainability.4,
The dissonance between the duty to consult and accommodate
framework as articulated in Ktunaxa and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,1" and its emphasis on
"free, prior and informed" consent by Indigenous peoples with respect to
use of their territory, 4, is striking. And this dissonance has come to a
head in the struggles over the Trans Mountain Pipeline project, which
the federal government took over from Kinder Morgan the spring of
2018, and which a number of BC Indigenous communities continue to
oppose on grounds, among others, of inadequate consultation.146 The
Squamish Nation and Tsleil-Waututh Nation have successfully
challenged the project in federal court,1 47 and the fate of the pipeline
likely will be resolved by the Supreme Court of Canada.
143 Ibid.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007,
A/RES/61/295, online (pdf): <www.un.org/development/desa/indigenous
peoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP E web.pdf>.
145 Ibid, art 11.2.
146 See Shawn McCarthy, "First Nations Leaders Claim Ottawa Did Not Properly
Consult BC Communities on Trans Mountain Project", The Globe andMail (4 May
2018) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
147 See Tsleil- Waututh Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153.
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The construction of new infrastructure to support the highly
polluting fossil fuel industry is arguably inherently unsustainable.
However, under existing regulatory regimes, pipelines can be approved
even if relevant environmental assessment processes reveal serious threats
to the environment. The section 35 jurisprudence does not equip
Indigenous communities in Canada to defend their territories against
such threats, since it expressly excludes an Indigenous veto over
destructive development. While the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged in Tsilhqot'in Nation 14 that the ecological sustainability of
Indigenous lands and waters is fundamental to their survival and
wellbeing, its section 35 jurisprudence as a whole provides largely
procedural protections. There is no substantive ecological bottom line of
section 35 to guarantee crucial environmental interests. It is difficult to
see how reconciliation can be achieved in the face of this profound
tension in our constitutional relationship with Indigenous peoples. We
would argue that recognition of a UCP of ecological sustainability could
help to reorient judicial analysis in cases such as those discussed above, to
focus on substantive ecological outcomes rather than mere
procedural protections.
The far-reaching implications of reconciliation (both within and
beyond section 35) also open up a different implication of recognizing
ecological sustainability as a UCP, which relates to standing. Part of the
limitations of environmental litigation is that non-human life does not
have standing to make arguments in Court 149 (though sometimes NGOs
will be granted intervention to advance arguments on their behalf), i s°
Other jurisdictions have explored novel mechanisms to overcome this
148 Supra note 123.
149 See Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: Law, Morality, and the
Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
150 See e.g. 114957 Canada Lte (Spraytech, Societe dhirrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001
SCC 40 in which the World Wildlife Fund, the Sierra Club of Canada, and several
other environmental NGOs were granted intervention at the Supreme Court of
Canada to offer perspectives on the legality of a municipal by-law restricting the use
of pesticides.
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procedural limitation. For example, New Zealand has recognized the
Whanganui River as having standing in litigation affecting its well-being,
through the Maori community that is recognized as descendants of and a
guardian for the river."'1 Ecuador has recognized the rights of Mother
Earth (or "Pacha Mama") in its Constitution in keeping with the legal
and spiritual understandings of its Indigenous peoples.112 In Canada,
recognition of a UCP of ecological sustainability would go a long
way towards enshrining Indigenous environmental law in our
constitutional order.
To conclude, reconciliation under section 35 and the duty to consult
and accommodate have proven limited in providing legal accountability
over environmental discretion affecting Indigenous communities. On
the other hand, this constitutional jurisprudence may provide an
important foundation for the recognition of a UCP for ecological
sustainability, particularly with respect to understanding environmental
well-being as significant beyond its utility for human well-being,
including meaningful concern for the health of wildlife, plant life, air
quality, and water quality as constitutional values in and of themselves.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, a large and compelling body of scholarship has
demonstrated convincingly that environmental law in Canada (and
around the world) has thus far failed to secure our common future."13 Put
151 See Eleanor Ainge Roy, "New Zealand River Granted Same Legal Rights as Human
Being", The Guardian (16 March 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/world
/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being>
(another model for constitutional recognition). See also Michael Safi, "Ganges and
Yamuna Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Beings", The Guardian (21
March 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/21/ganges-and-
yamuna-rivers-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-beings> (India granting legal
personhood to two rivers and cites the New Zealand precedent).
152 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008, art 71, online: <pdba.georgetown
.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html>.
153 See e.g. Boyd, Unnatural Law, supra note 5; Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier, supra
note 6; Craig Collins, Toxic Loopholes: Failures and Future Prospects for
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simply, humans have now eroded natural systems on a global scale and to
an extent that threatens the present and future wellbeing of people,
plants, animals, and ecosystems. But science and history also teach us
that there is hope; the same human ingenuity that created this
unprecedented problem can be mobilized to solve it.154 In many cases,
technological solutions exist to meet the daunting environmental
challenges of our time. 55 If we collectively commit to mitigate, reverse,
and prevent environmental harms, a sustainable future is possible. This
process will arguably require broad-based engagement by nearly every
sector and community on Earth, but some actors enjoy a unique power
to catalyze the necessary shift away from environmentally destructive
modes of living and towards long-term sustainability 56 Constitutionally
independent courts, insulated from the political short-termism inherent
in electoral democracies,15 7 could play a leading role in transforming
environmental governance in the public interest, but only if they are
willing and able to control the exercise of environmental discretion by
the other branches of government.
In this exploratory study, we have argued that environmental
discretion is a key challenge in charting Canada's path towards a
sustainable future. We have advanced the recognition of the UCP of
ecological sustainability as a promising approach to addressing this
challenge. We have explored the various sources of the unwritten
constitutional principles of ecological sustainability, and the potential
impact of recognizing ecological sustainability as a UCP. The principle
EnvironmentalLaw (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Mary Christina
Wood, Natures Trust: Environmental Law for A New Ecological Age (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Speth, supra note 116.
154 See David R Boyd, The Optimistic Environmentalist: Progressing Towards A Greener
Future (Toronto: ECW Press, 2015).
155 See e.g. Guy Dauncey, The Climate Challenge: 101 Solutions to Global Warming
(Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2009).
156 See Louis J Kotze, "Rethinking Global Environmental Law and Governance in the
Anthropocene" (2014) 32:2JERL 121.
157 See generally Weiss, supra note 67.
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of ecological sustainability operates alongside, and is complementary to,
other constitutional and law reform initiatives aimed at clarifying the
legal infrastructure of environmental protection. Finally, we have
suggested specific and meaningful benefits that would flow from the
recognition of the UCP of ecological sustainability, including a more
consistent and compelling framework for guiding environmental
discretion, a mechanism for enhancing reconciliation with Indigenous
peoples, and a catalyst for political, social, and cultural change.
Critics may understandably doubt the wisdom, or even utility, of
adding a new principle to the already controversial category of unwritten
constitutional principles. It is certainly true that an ecological UCP will
serve little purpose if judges fail to use it and regulators fail to respect it.
One can certainly imagine a world in which the UCP of ecological
sustainability is just one more item in a catalogue of promising legal
principles that failed to have an impact on environmental outcomes. On
the other hand, it is equally possible that enlightened legislators and
progressive jurists could employ the UCP of ecological sustainability to
great effect. In particular, such a UCP could counter the "[c]ategorical,
presumptive, and ultimately excessive judicial deference to executive and
administrative decision-making" that has too often characterized
environmental case law in Canada. i"' The effective oversight of
environmental decision making requires judicial courage, l"9 and a
commitment to remain relevant in the realm of sustainability.160
We believe that recognition of an ecological UCP could be a useful
tool for judges as they face increasingly urgent and challenging
environmental lawsuits.
Ultimately, in our view, Canadian constitutional law will need to find
more holistic and coherent ways to address ecological sustainability than
it has to date. As it does, the crucial parameters within which discretion
15' MacLean & Tollefson, supra note 39 at 250.
159 See generally Maclvor, supra note 110 (lamenting the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to use UCPs to defend the rule of law from government incursion under the Harper
administration).
160 Wood, supra note 153.
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is exercised, both in the promulgation of regulations and their
application, will need to align more clearly with the statutory purposes
and constitutional values of environmental protection. The crucial
message for decision makers at all levels is this: if our constitution is a
living tree, then ecological sustainability is the ground in which it
is rooted.
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